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CASE NOTES
for the protection of the discharged debtor and a clear recognition of the
duty to evaluate fully the practical adequacy of his remedy in the state
forum. Consequently, Fallick v. Kehr represents not only a reaffirmation of
the protective policy of the Bankruptcy Act, but also a prospective warning
to creditors who abuse their traditional right to have the issue of discharge-
ability determined in the forum of their choice.
FREDERICK S. LENZ, JR.
Corporations—Stockholders' Personal Liability—Application of Agency
or Undercapitalization Theory to "Pierce Corporate Veil."—Walkov-
szky v. Carlton. 1—Seon Cab Corporation consisted of two taxicabs, each
heavily mortgaged, each with the minimum $10,000 liability insurance re-
quired by New York law.'- Carlton and two others were the organizers and
principal stockholders of Seon Cab and of nine other cab corporations, each
with similar assets. Plaintiff Walkovszky alleged that he sustained personal
injuries when he was struck by a taxicab owned by Seon Cab. Since the
corporate assets of Seon Cab were insufficient to cover plaintiff's damages,
he attempted to gain the deficiency by joining as defendants the nine other
corporations and the stockholders, in addition to the driver and Seon Cab. 3
The trial court's ruling, which had dismissed the complaint against the
stockholders, was reversed by the New York Supreme Court, Appellate.
Division" They therefore appealed to the Court of Appeals which HELD:
The complaint is dismissed for failure to state a cause of action against
the individual defendants, 5 since in New York a stockholder is not personally
liable for the torts of his corporation unless there is a showing that he was
conducting its business in his individual capacity without regard to the
corporate entity.°
The holding of the Court of Appeals follows a long line of New York
decisions based upon the precepts of Judge Cardozo in Berkey v. Third Ave.
Ry., 7 wherein he stated:
[T]he corporate entity will be ignored when the parent corporation
operates a business through a subsidiary which is characterized as
an "alias" or "dummy." . . . [T]he essential term to be defined is
the act of operation. Dominion may be so complete, interference
1 18 N.Y.2d 414, 223 N.E.2d 6, 276 N.Y.S.2d 585 (1966).
2 N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 370(1) (a) (McKinney Supp. 1966).
3 This action was also brought against two other corporations, not important to
the outcome of this case.
4 Walkovszky v. Carlton, 24 App. Div. 2d 582, 262 N.Y.S.2d 334 (1965).
5 The claim against Seon Cab and the other cab corporations is still pending.
6 See, e.g., African Metals Corp. v. Bullowa, 288 N.Y. 78, 41 N.E.2d 466 (1942);
Nate!son v. A.B.L. Holding Co., 260 N.Y. 233, 183 N.E. 373 (1932); Quaid v. Rat-
kowsky, 183 App. Div. 428, 170 N.Y.S. 812 (Sup. Ct. 1918), aff'd, 224 N.Y. 624, 121
N.E. 887 (1918).
7 244 N.Y. 84, 155 N.E. 58 (1926) .
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so obtrusive, that by the general rules of agency the parent will be
a principal and the subsidiary an agent. 8
The New York courts have consistently adhered to this rule despite the
fact that the ends of justice might otherwise require the disregarding of the
separate entity of the corporate structure. Although the theory of agency,
as described in Berkey, is used most often to hold a parent liable for the
contracts or torts of a subsidiary,° it has also been occasionally extended
to hold a stockholder liable for the debts of his corporation." The latter
occurs when the corporation is a "dummy" for its stockholders, who are
really carrying on the business in their individual capacity. 11 It appears, then,
that the New York courts will apply their "agency" rule to pierce the
corporate veil to hold a stockholder or a parent corporation liable only in
those situations in which its control over the corporation is so overwhelming
that the court cannot reasonably ignore it.
In Mangan v. Terminal Transp. Sys.,' 2 a managing corporation was
established to control all the operational details of four operating cab corpora-
tions. The managing corporation was held liable for the negligence of a driver
of one of the operating corporations. Since the managing corporation's
control over the operating corporations was so dominant, the court was
easily able to see a principal-agent relationship between the parent and
subsidiary. In Majestic Factors Corp. v. Latino," a corporation, without
assets of any kind, was formed by ffire partners in an attempt to insulate
themselves from personal liability occasioned in the partnership. The court
'found that because the corporation was completely dominated and controlled
by the partners, the corporation was merely the "selling agent" for the
partnership, and therefore did not insulate the individuals from personal
liability. It should be noted that in both Mangan and Latino control was so
great that the court was able to conclude that, in effect, a principal-agent
relationship existed.
The New York courts do not seem to have too much difficulty in
applying the Berkey agency theory where they can point to a parent-
subsidiary relationship, such as that which existed in Mangan. However, a
problem arises when, as in the Walkovszky case, there is no such preexisting
parent-subsidiary situation. The courts do not seem willing to "construct" a
principal-agent relationship where a group of stockholders organize and, as
officers, direct many small corporations, even if the control exercised by them
is very extensive, since this is legally protected operating procedure for close
corporations.
8 Id. at 94-95, 155 N.E. at 61.
9 Robinson v. Chase Maintenance Corp., 20 Misc. 2d 90, 190 N.Y.S.2d 773 (Sup.
Ct. 1959); Mangan v. Terminal Transp. Sys., 157 Misc. 627, 284 N.Y.S. 183 (Sup. Ct.
1935), aff'd, 247 App. Div. 853, 286 N.Y.S. 666 (1936).
to Majestic Factors Corp. v. Latino, 15 Misc. 2d 329, 184 N.Y.S.2d 658 (Sup. Ct.
1959).
11 Weisser v. Mursam Shoe Corp., 127 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1942); Natelson v. A.B.L.
Holding Co., supra note 6.
12 157 Misc. 627, 284 N.Y.S. 183 (Sup. Ct. 1935), aff'd, 247 App. Div. 853, 286
N.Y.S. 666 (1936).
13 15 Misc. 2d 329, 184 N.Y.S.2d 658 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
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In Walkovszky, no managing corporation was ever organized; the
three stockholders performed the necessary managerial functions in their
capacities as the officers and directors of the ten cab corporations. The court
would not analogize the stockholders in Walkovszky to the managing corpo-
ration in Mangan for purposes of constructing a principal-agent relationship
and thereby holding the stockholders liable for the torts of their "agent,"
Seon Cab. In this regard the court was correct, for if stockholders observe
the formalities of incorporation and exercise control in a manner which is
usual for the close corporation, they should not be individually liable. Thus,
reliance on the Berkey agency theory alone, without examining other
theories upon which the corporate fiction may be disregarded, severely
circumscribes the court from judging on its merits a case that otherwise
demands piercing of the corporate veil.
In Walkovszky, the court was confronted solely with a motion to dismiss
by the individual defendants. It is submitted that the court dismissed this
case too soon, for it should have considered more carefully two other issues:
(1) whether or not the ten corporations were in reality a single enterprise,
and (2) whether or not either Seon Cab or the ten-cab enterprise was
undercapitalized. The court should have determined whether the facts
were sufficient to allow the tort claimant to go beyond the single cab corpora-
tion and combine all ten corporations as an enterprise entity. This might
have been accomplished by analogizing the common stockholders in Wal-
kovszky to the managing corporation in Mangan, but only for the purpose of
establishing an enterprise entity—not for placing liability on the individual
stockholders. The theory of an economic enterprise entity was first system-
atically established by Professor Berle." His thesis is that the sovereign
grants the status of "corporation" to a definable group, engaged in an enter-
prise. 15
 Professor Berle, however, circumscribes the scope of his thesis by
limiting its application to the situation where a principal-agent relationship
is established. This seems to be an unduly severe restriction of the possible
use of this theory. The courts are supposed to be able to "disregard the
corporate fiction specifically because it has parted company with the enter-
prise-fact, for whose furtherance the corporation was created . . . ."" It
is submitted that, as established by Berle, the enterprise theory does not
promote a more workable guide for disregarding the corporate entity, since
it fails to examine the actual economic facts in determining the enterprise
entity. Thus, where there are many small corporations owned and controlled
substantially by the same persons in the same or similar types of business,
the corporations should be viewed as a single enterprise; this should not
depend on the finding of a principal-agent relationship.
A close examination of the economic realities in Walkovszky might re-
veal that the enterprise was not Seon Cab but the ten cab corporations
14 Berle, The Theory of Enterprise Entity, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 343 (1947).
15 Each individual corporation established under the laws of the state is presumed
to be a separate enterprise. If, in fact, the corporation does not encompass the assets
and liabilities of an enterprise, the courts should disregard it as a separate entity
and judicially construct the actual entity. Id. at 344.
16 Id. at 348.
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together. If the court had examined the ten corporations under the literal
meaning of the Berle theory, it could have determined that the stockholders
had cleverly evaded its scope by not establishing a controlling partnership
or corporation which could create a principal-agent relationship. Without
the parent-subsidiary relationship which Berle envisioned for application of
his "enterprise entity" theory, the New York courts will look no further.
A realistic test requires the courts to look to the actual substantive enterprise
without being constricted solely by agency rules.
Even if the court in Walkovszky could not find that all ten corporations
formed a single enterprise, it could have gone further to determine whether
the individual stockholders should be personally liable. Having found no
agency, the court, in order to place liability on the stockholders, should then
consider whether Seon Cab was undercapitalized. 17 New York courts, how-
ever, tend to avoid this issue,'s despite the fact that many other courts
consider whether or not a corporation is adequately capitalized before
allowing it to reap the benefits of limited liability. 19
The concept of adequate capitalization is not to be found in modern
corporation statutes, although they may provide for a minimum amount of
capital which must be subscribed and/or paid in before the corporation may
legally begin to function. Provisions commonly permit the corporation to
be formed with $500 or $1,000 stated capita1. 2° While this is a statutory
minimum to legal existence, many courts have imposed a more logical test by
requiring each individual corporation to place at risk sufficient capital to meet
the reasonably foreseeable expenses of the particular business:21 One court
put it this way:
17 All states today have laws which grant stockholders the privilege of putting needed
capital at the risk of the business, while at the same time freeing from that risk their
uninvested assets. Garrett & Garrett, Choosing the Form of Business Enterprise, 1954
U. Ill. L.F. 359. The allowance of limited liability has been consistent with the public
interest in encouraging investment in risky enterprises while still protecting creditors.
Douglas & Shanks, Insulation from Liability Through Subsidiary Corporations, 39
Yale L.J. 193 (1929). This privilege, however, is limited.
Contribution of risk capital to respond to the corporation's debts is the required
consideration for the stockholder's personal immunity. . . [Many] courts will
not tolerate any arrangement which would throw all the risks and hazards of
the business upon the public who deal with it, and at the same time enable
the stockholders to realize all possible gains while being secure against loss in
the event the enterprise should prove unprofitable . . .
Dix, Adequate Risk Capital: The Consideration for the Benefits of Separate Incorpora-
tion, 53 Nw. U.L. Rev. 478, 483-84 (1958).
18 See Bartle v. Home Owners Coop., 309 N.Y. 103, 127 N.E.2d 832 (1955).
19 See, e.g., Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U.S. 349 (1944); Mull v. Colt Co., 31 F.R.D.
154 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Minton v. Cavaney, 56 Cal. 2d 576, 364 P.2d 473, 15 Cal. Rptr.
641 (1961).
20 See, e.g., Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 271.085 (1963); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 14:2-3(e)
(1937) ; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1701 .04(A)(5) (Baldwin 1964); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 180.48
(1957); Model Bus. Corp. Act Ann. § 48(g) (1960).
21 See, e.g., Weisser v. Mursam Shoe Corp., supra note 11; Arnold v. Phillips,
117 F.2d 497 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 583 (1941); Automotriz Del Golfo
De California S.A. v. Resnick, 47 Cal. 2d 792, 306 P.2d 1 (1957). The test of ade-
quacy of capitalization should not be applied in an exact sense. It would not be,
desirable to assess a figure of what is adequate capitalization for a particular business,
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If . . . a corporation is organized with an obviously inadequate
capital setup, such fact may be considered in determining whether
the corporate entity should be disregarded. . . .
. . . .
Inadequate financing . . . is . . . an important factor .. .
in determining whether to remove the insulation to stockholders
normally created by the corporate method of operation. But in
such a case it is incumbent upon the one seeking to pierce the
corporate veil to show by evidence that the financial setup of the
corporation is just a sham, and accomplishes injustice. 22
Whether a corporation is adequately capitalized will depend on the circum-
stances surrounding the corporation in each individual case.
It may be that the popcorn man on the corner with little to antici-
pate in the way of credit for his immediate needs and with small
danger of large tort liability would be adequately capitalized at
the minimum of $500 or $1,000 . But what of the owner of a
fleet of taxis . . . ? If [he] . . . incorporate [s], what is the test
of adequate capitalization so that [he] . . . can be sure that [he]
. . . will not be held individually for the debts or tort claims of
[his] ... corporations t 23
Though there are no settled rules to test the adequacy of capitalization, in
Abbott v. Anderson 24 the United States Supreme Court did establish a
workable formula: "An obvious inadequacy of capital, measured by the
nature and magnitude of the corporate undertaking, has frequently been an
important factor in cases denying stockholders their defense of limited
liability."25 The courts look to whether the corporation had enough
capital to meet the ordinary foreseeable risks of operation, including fore-
seeable tort liability. Posing the test in this manner, the courts try to avoid
placing all the risk of incorporation on the public while giving all the
benefits to the incorporators.
In Walkovszky, the plaintiff attempted to base his cause of action on a
theory of undercapitalization. He contended that the public has a right to
assume that the industry has taken adequate precautions to assure recovery
for tort damages should an accident occur. He then alleged that Seon Cab
was undercapitalized, since a $10,000 insurance policy was not sufficient
to provide against reasonably foreseeable tort liability. 26 Plaintiff based his
argument on a proposition stated in a previous New York case:
Since the taxicab industry is vested with a public interest, and is
one of considerable hazard, the attempt to subject injured persons
and, merely because the corporation is below this figure, to deny the stockholders
limited liability. Therefore, most courts will not employ adequacy of capitalization as
the sole criterion for determining liability. See Annot., 63 A.L.R.2d 1051 (1959).
22 Carlesimo v. Schwebel, 87 Cal. App. 2d 482, 492-93, 197 P.2d 167, 173-74 (1948).
23 Lattin, Corporations 71 (1959).
24 321 U.S. 349 (1944).
25 Id. at 362.
26 Brief for Plaintiff, p. 2.
985
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
to the inadequate assets, ostensibly the operating capital of any of
the operating corporations, as alleged works a fraud, injustice and
unjust enrichment. 27 (Emphasis added.)
The Walkovszky court summarily dismissed this argument, stating that
"whatever rights [the plaintiff] ... may be able to assert against the parties
other than the registered owner of the vehicle come into being not because
he has been defrauded but because, under the principles of respondeat
superior, he is entitled to hold the whole enterprise responsible for the acts
of its agents." 28
Judges Keating and Bergman, dissenting, wanted to go beyond the
Berkey theory of agency, and questioned
whether the policy of this State, which affords those desiring to
engage in a business enterprise the privilege of limited liability
through the use of the corporate device, is so strong that it will
permit that privilege to continue , . . . no matter how irresponsibly
the corporation is operated, no matter what the cost to the public. 29
They therefore considered factors other than control and respondeat superior,
such as public policy and undercapitalization, and found that the stockholders
had intentionally undercapitalized Seon Cab so as to avoid their public re-
sponsibility. From this the dissenters concluded that "a participating stock-
holder of a corporation vested with public interest, organized with capital
insufficient to meet liabilities which are certain to arise in the ordinary
course of the corporation's business, may be held personally responsible for
such liabilities.""
One must inevitably wonder why someone in the position of the de-
fendants would not acquire more than $10,000 worth of insurance, especially
since such a corporation would be held liable for any judgment exceeding
$10,000. The answer appears to lie in a curious loophole in the bankruptcy
laws. Let us assume that damages from a tort action are so great that Seon
Cab declares bankruptcy. Under the New York City Administrative Code, a
taxicab medallion, the corporation's only other valuable asset, is not volun-
tarily transferable unless the transferee assumes the liabilities of the trans-
feror; it is involuntarily transferable for one year only. 31 The trustee in
bankruptcy, under Section 70(a) of the Federal Bankruptcy Act, 32 would
take title to all property of the bankrupt. The rationale of the Supreme
Court in Board of Trade v. Johnson33 permits the trustee to succeed to the
bankrupt's rights in the taxicab license, under section 70(a) (5), because
the cab corporation had the right to voluntarily transfer the license, subject
to the approval of the appropriate official, after showing that the transferee
27 Robinson v. Chase Maintenance Corp., 20 Misc. 2d 90, 92, 190 N.Y.S.2d 773,
775 (1959).
28 18 N.Y.2d at —, 223 N.E.2d at 10, 276 N.Y.S.2d at 591 .
29 Id. at —, 223 N.E.2d at 11, 276 N.Y.S.2d at 592.
39 Id. at —, 223 N.E.2d at 14, 276 N.Y.S.2d at 595.
31 N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 436-2.0. (1937).
32 30 Stat. 565 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 110(a) (1964).
33 264 U.S. 1 (1924).
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had assumed the liabilities of the transferor. Under the Johnson case, the
trustee would not be entitled to:use the license, but could only control the
bankrupt's right to dispose of it; nor would the trustee be able to transfer
the asset absent the restrictions placed on it. 34
Although the trustee could acquire title to the medallion, the liability
attached to it would make it very burdensome to him. Therefore, the trustee
would be desirous of either not succeeding to the title or, once having assumed
title, to get a court order allowing him to abandon the property. When the
trustee abandoned the property, it would revert to the bankrupt. 35
Since the tort claimant has no standing as a secured creditor, he would
be considered a general creditor with a claim provable under sections 63a( 7)
and (8). Six months after the adjudication of bankruptcy, the corporation
could petition the court for discharge. Since the claim of the judgment
creditor (tort claimant) was allowable and provable, the bankrupt would
be released from it by the court's discharge."
In effect, then, Seon Cab would emerge from a bankruptcy proceeding
with its medallion free from encumbrance and with the tort claimant's judg-
ment extinguished. It can be presumed that the incorporators of Seon Cab
knew of this result, and from such knowledge can be inferred the requisite
intent to undercapitalize the corporation.
The dissent would have the majority accept the undercapitalization
theory to disregard the corporate entity, at least as a rationale for curing
the gross inequities in the taxicab industry." Then, by establishing the
measure of adequate capitalization for Seon Cab or the ten-cab enterprise,
the court would have to determine whether either one was so undercapitalized
as to warrant revocation of limited liability. Although the preceding dis-
cussion indicates that liability would be clearly warranted, this result may
be precluded by certain New York legislation. Certainly in the instant case
much weight would have to be placed on the New York statute which pre-
scribed the minimum liability insurance required for taxicabs." The court
must determine whether the mandatory insurance set by statute is, absent
other assets, sufficient capital to protect tort claimants, or whether a higher
figure should be judicially established. The dissent viewed the mandatory
insurance simply as a minimum figure set by statute to "provide at least
some small fund for recovery against those individuals and corporations
who just did not have and were not able to raise or accumulate assets suffi-
cient to satisfy the claims of those, who were injured as a result of their
negligence." 3° (Emphasis added.)
It is difficult to agree with this view. The argument used by the dissent
—that the statute established merely a minimum requirement—is similar to
34 Id. at 11.
35 See Helvey v. United States Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 81 Cal. App. 2d 647, 184 P.2d
919 (1947).
33 That is, of course, unless the creditor's claim is not dischargeable. See Joslin,
Torts and Bankruptcy—A Synthesis, 1 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 185, 190-95 (1960).
37 See Mull v. Colt Co., supra note 19, at 158-60.
38 N.Y. Veh. & Traf, Law § 370 (McKinney Supp. 1966).
39 18 N.Y.2d at —, 223 N.E.2d at 13, 276 N.Y.S.2d at 594.
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that which is generally accepted by courts holding that the amount of paid-in
capital required by the incorporation statute is not conclusive of adequate
capitalization, but merely a prerequisite to legal recognition of the corpora-
tion. However, this "minimum requirement" argument does not have the same
validity when applied to the New York mandatory-insurance statute. In the
latter case, the legislature has established a specific insurance figure for
the taxicab industry, not a general figure applicable to all corporations, as is
the paid-in capital figure.
The legislature must be deemed to have known that most cab operators
are incorporated for the purpose of preventing personal responsibility, and
the minimum-insurance statute must be regarded as a clear indication of
what the legislature thought was adequate protection for the public. Thus,
for the purposes of limited liability, a $10,000 insurance policy should be
considered an adequate asset to compensate tort claimants. The legislature's
intent to have it so is clear, especially when it is noted that the liability
insurance was increased from $5,000 to $10,000 in 1959, and that the statute
has been twice amended since then without further increases. It is extremely
difficult to say that the court would be protecting legislative policy by
judicially increasing the minimum amount of insurance needed by taxicabs.
The incorporators are not using the corporate form to defeat or avoid any
legislative policy, but are only taking advantage of a legitimate form of
organization. If the $10,000 figure set by the legislature is not sufficient, it
should be raised by the legislature.
ANDREW J. NEWMAN
Labor Law—Labor Management Relations Act—Section 9(b) (2)—Re-
quirements for Severance of Craft Workers.—Mallinckrodt Chem.
Worhs. 1—Mallinckrodt Chemical Works, Uranium Division, Waldon Springs,
Missouri, was engaged in the manufacture of uranium metal and in the
purification of uranium ore under a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract with the
Atomic Energy Commission. Of its 560 employees, 280 were engaged in
production and maintenance, and were represented by the Independent Union
of Atomic Workers. Local 1 of the International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers petitioned the National Labor Relations Board to sever twelve
instrument mechanics from the unit represented by the Atomic Workers.
The IBEW claimed to have been a traditional representative of the
type of craftsmen involved in the suit. Petitioner demanded severance on
the basis of the need for separate representation of the instrument mechanics
as a "functionally distinct and homogeneous traditional departmental
group."2 HELD: Petitioner does not qualify as a traditional representative
of instrument mechanics of the type involved in this case, nor does the record
indicate that the interests of the mechanics have been neglected by the
Atomic Workers. Although the instrument mechanics do constitute a group
of skilled journeymen mechanics,
1 162 N.L.R.B. No. 48, 64 L.R.R.M. 1011 (1966).
2 Id., 64 L.R.R.M. at 1012.
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